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Abstract 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a coalition of the six Arab monarchies of the Gulf 
region, is by far the most developed regional integration organization of the Middle East. 
This Bachelor thesis tries to find reasons behind its emergence and its further development. 
In order to do so, a theory-based empirical approach is used, drawing from neorealist theories 
about alliance formation and the effects of domestic threats on regional integration. Two case 
studies - the emergence of the GCC and its behavior during the Arab Spring - are examined. 
The main finding from these theories and the case studies is that international and domestic 
threats played a major role in the development of the GCC and convinced Gulf leaders to 
embark upon a course directed towards closer cooperation with each other in order to 
strengthen their security in an unstable environment. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On December 19, 2011 the King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, 
officially opened the 32nd meeting of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) in Riyadh. In his opening address, after mentioning the numerous challenges facing 
the Gulf1 monarchies, he called upon the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, “not to 
stop and watch the status quo as whoever follows such a behavior will find himself in the end 
of the queue facing loss and weakness. We all don't accept this situation for our nations, 
peoples, stability and security.”2 He therefore asked the member states of the GCC “to go 
beyond the stage of cooperation to the stage of union in one entity that achieves the good and 
wards off evil”.3  
This public commitment by a leading monarch of an Arab gulf state to the long-term goal of 
a unification of the GCC states into one single political entity triggered a heated debate 
among the Gulf States. The mere existence of this proposal and the ensuing discussions show 
just how far the six Arab monarchies of the  Gulf, namely the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State 
of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, the Emirate of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, have  gone in their attempts to strengthen their coordination and to 
increase their cooperation with each other within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. 
Seen in the light of the political situation of the Gulf roughly 40 years ago, in 1971, directly 
after the former Trucial States gained their independence from Great Britain, this high degree 
of cooperation seems to have been highly unlikely. Although 7 out of the 9 former Trucial 
emirates within a year united to form the United Arab Emirates, the problems and 
shortcomings associated with the constituting negotiations can already be seen as a 
microcosm of the numerous obstacles lying in the way of cooperation among Gulf states, 
ranging from external forces, historical rivalries and territorial disputes4 to fears of economic 
dominance due to an unequal distribution of resources and a general mistrust between states 
                                                 
1
 In order to avoid disputed and politically loaded terms such as “Persian Gulf” or “Arab Gulf”, I will use the 
more neutral term “Gulf” without addendum in this thesis. For the political use of the term “Arab Gulf” see 
Bosworth, C. Edmund, The Nomenclature of the Persian Gulf, in: Iranian Studies 30, no. 1/2 (1997), pp.77-94, 
p.94. 
2
 Al Arabiya News, King Abdullah’s vision for road to the union, 24 December 2012, available at: 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/24/256902.html [accessed 30.12.2012]. 
3
 Ibid.  
4
 For an overview of the territorial disputes and the often bitter-fought struggles resulting from them see 
Ohkrulik, Gwenn and Conge, Patrick J., The Politics of Border disputes. On the Arabian Penisula, in: 
International Journal 54, no. 2 (1999), pp. 230-248. 
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of the region.5 Nevertheless, only one decade later, on May 25, 1981 the leaders of the six 
aforementioned states, building on various forms of cooperation in the antecedent years, 
gathered in Abu Dhabi and formally signed the founding charter of the GCC. Since then, over 
the last three decades, the level of integration between the GCC members has significantly 
increased in various fields from economy to security. Furthermore, the GCC states have also 
sharpened their common foreign policy profile and increasingly coordinate their diplomatic 
efforts. Today the GCC is by far the most successful and most advanced regional 
organization in the Arab world and the Middle East.  
But how has this development been possible and how can it be accounted for? What were the 
driving factors that convinced the monarchs of the GCC states, who are usually very keen to 
protect their national sovereignty, to participate in such a project? And are the same 
mechanisms and motivations that caused the formation of the GCC still valid today? Given 
the tremendous geopolitical and economic importance of the Gulf region and the many ways 
the level of cooperation between GCC members influences events in the Gulf, the 
significance of these questions becomes obvious. 
Therefore this thesis will take a closer look at them and will attempt to offer a contribution to 
the ongoing scientific debate about them. After a brief overview of the main scientific 
approaches to the emergence of the GCC and about the organization itself, a theory-based 
empirical approach to the topic will be followed. Therefore the second part of this text will 
address the theoretical approaches to the topic, in which, for various reasons to be outlined 
below, a focus on neorealist thinking will be placed. The main assumption drawn from this 
background is that mainly international and domestic threats provided the background and 
the motivation for the GCC states to embark upon a course directed towards closer ties with 
each other. In order to test this assumption the third and last part of this thesis will try to 
examine its validity on the background of two case studies during the history of the GCC, the 
first one being an examination of the years that led to the foundation of the organization and 
its immediate aftermath, the second one being the more actual context of the Arab Spring 
protests. The aim will be to assess the main motivations, motives and mechanisms that 
contributed to the collaboration of the Gulf states during these time periods. 
 
                                                 
5
 For the role of these factors in the formation of the UAE see Legrenzi, Matteo, The GCC and the International 
Relations of the Gulf. Diplomacy, Security and Economic Cooperation in a Changing Middle East, I.B. Tauris, 
London et al., 2011, pp.11-20. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
An overview of the relevant literature and a short presentation of several important points of 
view on the matter in the scientific debate is necessary since this work will mainly be based 
on an analysis of secondary literature on the subject,  
While several approaches try to account for the emergence of the GCC,6 two of them are 
especially widespread and important for the scientific debate. 7  One tries to explain the 
emergence of the GCC as the “natural”8 result of the inherent cultural, social, religious and 
political proximity of the participating states.9 The main arguments of this substantial group 
of scholars, which dominated scientific debates in the early years of the GCC, have been 
summarized by Emile A. Nakleh.10 Recent social constructivist approaches to the GCC share 
some aspects with this point of view, but have rejected the notion of a “natural” development 
of the coalition and instead have put greater emphasis on the notion of the construction of a 
common identity between the Gulf states as a factor for the development of the GCC.11 
The other strand of argumentation, which this thesis will try to bolster with empirical 
evidence, finds its basis in neorealist theories. Neorealist authors emphasize the significance 
of the numerous security threats in the dangerous environment of the Gulf region for an 
explanation of the emergence of the GCC.12  While these classical neorealist approaches 
certainly have their merits, the problematic neorealist view of states as black boxes, has 
caused several of these authors to broaden their viewpoint and to include various other 
factors, which do not conform to traditional neorealism. This has mainly happened through 
the inclusion of domestic factors as drivers for the development of the GCC.13  Special 
attention will be paid to these works, mainly for the second part of this thesis regarding the 
role of domestic threats. 
                                                 
6
 For some of these approaches see Lawson, Fred H., Theories of Integration in a New Context. The Gulf 
Cooperation Council, in: Thomas, Kenneth P. And Tétreault, Mary Ann (ed.), Racing to Regionalize. 
Democracy, Capitalism and Regional Political Economy, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London et al., 1999. 
7
 For a brief overview of the two approaches presented here see Holthaus, Leonie, Regimelegitimität und 
regionale Kooperation im Golf-Kooperationsrat (Gulf Cooperation Council), Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 
2010, pp.32-42. 
8
 Nakleh, Emile A., The Gulf Cooperation Council. Policies, Problems and Prospects, Praeger Publishers, New 
York et al., 1986, p.XVI 
9
 Holthaus, Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, p.32. 
10
 Nakleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council, p.XVI.  
11
 Holthaus, Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, pp.41-42.  
12
 Ibid., p.32. 
13
 Examples can be found for instance in Walt, Stephen M., The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca et al., 1987, who includes concerns about legitimacy as an important factor and in Cooper, Scott and 
Taylor, Brock, Power and Regionalism. Explaining Regional Cooperation in the Persian Gulf, in: Laursen, Finn 
(ed.), Comparative Regional Integration. Theoretical Perspectives, Ashgate Publishing, Burlington et al., 2003,  
who emphasize the role of domestic threats as factors for regional integration. 
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3. The Gulf Cooperation Council 
 
Considerations about the nature of the Gulf Cooperation Council are indispensable for any 
analysis of its development. What exactly is this organization? The descriptions and 
assessments vary widely depending on the point of view, the time period and the situation, 
reaching from a mere “council of rulers” 14  to a comprehensive regional integration 
organization, whose ”establishment [...] heralded a shift in the organization of the 
international politics of the Gulf”,15 and from “first and foremost a security arrangement”16 to 
an organization whose focus lies in the economic sector.17 As this spectrum of opinions 
shows, there is a certain degree of dissent about the nature of the GCC, and some sort of 
clarification and positioning on these issues is necessary for this work. 
To get a clearer view on the institutional structure of the organization, the fields of 
cooperation among them and generally the nature of the GCC will therefore be the purpose of 
this mostly descriptive chapter in order to acquire the necessary background for further 
analysis. 
3.1 The Member States 
 
The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, covering the entire southern shore of 
the Gulf from Kuwait City to the Strait of Hormuz share several quite specific characteristics. 
The Gulf is one of the few regions of the world where monarchies still form the dominant 
political system, and the six local Arab monarchies form the GCC.  The respective ruling 
dynasties all follow a conservative form of Sunni Islam,18 but in some cases preside over 
sizeable Shi’a minorities.19 According to estimations 46 percent of the world’s proven oil 
reserves are in the possession of the GCC states.20 The enormous wealth gained from these 
                                                 
14
 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, p.2. 
15
 Ibid, pp.2-3. 
16
 Nakleh, The Gulf Cooperation Council, p.50. 
17
 Holthaus, Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, p.60. 
18
 The exception forms Oman, where the ruler and the majority of the Population follows the Ibadi 
denomination of Islam, O’Reilly, Marc J., Omanibalancing. Oman Confronts an Uncertain Future, in: Middle 
East Journal 52, no.1 (1998), pp.70-84, p.72. 
19
 Ramazani, R.K., The Gulf Cooperation Council. Record and Analysis, University Press of Virginia, 
Charlottesville, 1988, p.200. Although estimates vary, and Ramazani puts the number of Shi’ites in Bahrain at 
merely 49%, most sources suggest Shi’ites actually form the majority of the population in Bahrain. Sometimes 
the figures are put as high as 75%, Nasr, Vali, When the Shi’ites Rise, in: Foreign Affairs, 85, no. 4 (2006), pp. 
58-75, p.65. Cooper and Taylor suggest that Shi’a minorities are especially important, since they form a larger 
percentage of the citizen populations of the GCC countries and that they are often situated in strategically 
relevant geographical locations, Cooper, Power and Regionalism, pp. 113-114.   
20
 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, p.69.  
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resources, resulting in the establishment of rentier states,21 in combination with the skillful 
policy of the local monarchies, has led to the development of a unique political environment, 
that allowed the traditional ruling dynasties to keep the reins of power firmly in their hand, 
despite the economical and geopolitical dynamism of the region. 22  Michael Herb 
characterizes Saudi Arabia and the UAE as absolute monarchies, while Kuwait, Qatar, 
Bahrain and Oman are described as constitutional monarchies.23 Despite this difference, their 
political systems are still - to different degrees - characterized by an autocratic political 
system24 and the control of the most important decision-making positions of the state by 
members of the ruling family.25  
This is also true for the foreign policy establishment of these states, as all of the six heads of 
government and all of the six foreign ministers of the GCC states, as of December 2012, are 
members of the respective royal families,26 and most foreign policy decisions are therefore 
taken under the direct influence of the monarchs and the royal family, with few actors and 
probably few diverging opinions and discussions involved.27 This close interaction explains, 
why the preservation of the monarchical system in the face of international and domestic 
threats forms the primary principle of the foreign policies of these states.28  
 
 
                                                 
21
 For a recent description of rentier states and rentier mechanisms in the context of the GCC states see Hertog, 
Steffen, The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems. Societies of Intermediaries, in: Comparative Studies of 
Society and History, 52, no. 2 (2010), pp.282-318.  
22
 For an overview of the various arguments on this matter, see Frisch, Hillel, Why monarchies persist. 
balancing between internal and external vulnerabilities, in: Review of International Studies 37, no.1 (2011), 
pp.167-184, pp.171-178. 
23
 Herb, Michael, Princes and Parliaments in the Arab world, in: Middle East Journal 58, no.3 (2004), pp.367-
384, p.373. As Herb himself notes, the term “constitutional monarchies” in this context merely signifies “a 
monarchy with an elected parliament that has not wholly usurped the monarch’s power to determine the 
composition of the ministry” and should not be confused with the “common[...] denot[ion] [of] a democracy 
decorated by a monarchy”, Ibid., p. 369. 
24
 According to the Freedom House Index 2012, all of the GCC states with the exception of the “partly free” 
Kuwait, are characterized as “not free”, Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2012. The Arab Uprisings and 
their Repercussions in the World, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/ 
Table%20of%20Independent%20Countries%2C%20FIW%202012%20draft.pdf [accessed 31.12.2012]. 
25
 Michael Herb has described this special set of power distribution as “dynastic monarchy”, Herb, Michael, All 
in the Family. Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies, State University of 
New York Press, Albany, 1999. 
26
 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign 
Governments. A Directory, December 2012, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-
leaders-1/pdf-version/December2012ChiefsDirectory.pdf [accessed 31.12.2012].  
This also has effects on the GCC, where members of the Gulf dynasties likewise hold the most important 
positions, Holthaus, Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, p.59. 
27
 See Gause, Gregory F. III, Oil monarchies. Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, 
Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1994, p.120 and Schwarz, Rolf, Die Außenpolitik der 
arabischen Golfstaaten. Herrschaftspolitische Balanceakte unter externem Schutz, in: Albrecht, Holger (ed.), 
Der Vordere Orient. Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007, p.90. 
28
 Gause, Oil monarchies, p.120. 
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3.2 Institutional Structure 
 
In what framework do these states organize their integration efforts within the GCC? “[T]he 
highest authority”29 within the organization is its Supreme Council, a body formed by the six 
heads of state of the member states, which, unless one member state demands otherwise, 
convene yearly.30 Its function is to lay down the basic principles and guidelines for the policy 
of the GCC and it has authority over any key aspect of the organization.31 The vote of all 
heads of states has equal weight and the presidency of the Council changes annually between 
the member states.32 Regarding substantial decisions a consensus has to be reached and, to 
further underline the intergovernmental character of the GCC, decisions by the Supreme 
Council are not binding for the member states.33  The sovereign and dominant role of the 
monarchs in the political structure of the individual GCC member states is thus transferred to 
the organization as a whole.34 Attached to the Supreme Council is a Commission for the 
Settlement of Disputes, which is established “at an ‘ad hoc’ basis”.35 The Ministerial Council 
is on the next level of the GCC hierarchy, formed by the foreign ministers and, if necessary, 
other ministers which meet every three months with the same rules applying to presidency 
and decision-making as in the Supreme Council.36 It is concerned with various tasks, like the 
proposal of policies and recommendations, the “encourage[ment], develop[ment] and 
coordinat[ion] of activities existing between member states in all fields”, 37  and the 
preparation of Supreme Council meetings.38  
The third main institution of the GCC is the General Secretariat in Riyadh,39  which is, 
amongst other tasks, concerned with the administrative and financial aspects of the GCC and 
“follows up the implementation by the member states of the resolutions and 
recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial Council”. 40  Furthermore, the 
General Secretary is the official representative of the organization.41 Within the Secretariat, 
                                                 
29
 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, The Charter, available at: 
http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/indexfc7a.html?action=Sec-Show&ID=1 [accessed 31.12.2012]. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Holthaus, Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, p.55. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, The Charter. 
36
 Holthaus, Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, p.56. 
37
 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, The Charter. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 The Riyadh-based GCC Secretariat is financed in equal shares by all member states and has about 300 
employees, The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, The Charter and 
Holthaus, Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation im Golf-Kooperationsrat, p.57.  
40
 The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, Secretariat General, The Charter. 
41
 Holthaus,Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, p.57. 
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various departments exist for the different sectors of cooperation, from a Patent Bureau to 
Human and Environment Affairs,42 the most important being those for economic and political 
affairs. This importance is accentuated by the appointment of deputy General Secretaries in 
charge of these departments.43 
3.3 Fields of Cooperation 
 
Out of the various sectors of cooperation within the GCC, three spheres of cooperation have 
emerged to be the most important ones for the organization, in rhetoric and aims as well as in 
practice: economic cooperation, political cooperation and security cooperation.  
Economic cooperation featured as the most important part of the GCC in the public debate of 
its early years,44 and, built on the Unified Economic Agreement (1981) and the Economic 
Agreement (2001) has made considerable progress. Early initiatives focused mainly on the 
free movement of persons and goods between the GCC states, and several aims in this sector, 
outlined in the chapter 4 of the GCC charter, “have come close to being fully realized”,45 
with steps towards the establishment of a Free Trade Area and common market status. 46  In 
the field of joint economic initiatives, the GCC in the framework of the Gulf Investment 
Cooperation (GIC) has been a successful and efficient actor in supporting the economic 
projects in the member states.47 However, in other fields of economic integration progress has 
been slow and the actual outcomes of GCC initiatives have been meager, often not matching 
the ambitious aims.48 While economic cooperation has gathered new momentum since 2000, 
it also has experienced several setbacks as for instance the introduction of a common 
currency, originally planned for in 2010, has been postponed.49  
In the field of political cooperation the record of the GCC is a mixed one too: The work of 
the organization as a tool for the settling of internal disputes can hardly be described as a 
success story.50 The Commission for the Settlement of Disputes has never been summoned 
                                                 
42
 Holthaus,Regimelegitimität und regionale Kooperation, p.57. 
43
 For a complete list see Al-Diwan Al-Amiri, State of Kuwait, GCC Summit. About GCC, available at: 
http://www.da.gov.kw/eng/articles/about_gcc.php [accessed 31.12.2012]. 
44
 Twinam, Joseph Wright, The Gulf, Cooperation and The Council. An American Perspective, Middle East 
Policy Council, Washington D.C., 1992, p.12. 
45
 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, p.59. 
46
 Ibid., pp.63-65. 
47
 Ibid., pp.66-69. 
48
 Ibid., p.57. This is actually a general characteristic of the GCC: While many far-reaching decisions are 
publicly proclaimed and put into charter provisions, their actual implementation is often not guaranteed, Ibid., 
p.9. 
49
 The World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Region, Economic Integration in the GCC, available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTMENA/Resources/GCCStudyweb.pdf [accessed 31.12.2012], pp.6-7 and 
Legrenzi, The GCC, p.65. 
50
 Gause, Oil monarchies, p. 132. 
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during the existence of the organization,51 and “intra-GCC disputes have been settled outside 
the GCC institutional framework.” 52  Regarding the diplomatic cooperation of the GCC 
members towards external states, a common stance is often hindered by the differing foreign 
policy aims among the member states.53 The GCC therefore primarily “acts as a loose forum 
on the diplomatic scene”,54 but nevertheless can sometimes be an effective tool to enhance 
the political weight of individual member states on the international stage.55 
The third and maybe most interesting field of cooperation among GCC members can be 
found in the security arena, divided in the two fields of external and internal security 
cooperation. While the term has often been rejected by its leaders, the GCC states with their 
mutual guarantees of protection form “at least partially an alliance”56 and the initial goals in 
the realm of military cooperation were far-reaching.57 A common military force, the so called 
Peninsula Shield Force was established in the 1980s, consisting of contingents of the various 
national armies,58 several common military exercises have been organized and especially in 
the field of joint air defense several steps have been taken.59 However, overall, while military 
cooperation between GCC states “has been noticeable, it has never been substantial”,60 and it 
has never matched up to the rhetoric about it.61 
In the related field of internal security, cooperation between the six member states is probably 
most advanced. While this form of cooperation is usually not organized through the GCC 
General Secretariat, and difficult when it comes to plots within the royal families, intelligence 
cooperation against shared internal threats, especially against Islamist threats, is highly 
developed.62 An internal security agreement was ratified in 1987 and is mainly concerned 
with the “collaboration among security services [...] issues of information exchange, 
extradition and propaganda aimed against regimes”.63 Meetings between security officials are 
common in the framework of the GCC, and unlike cooperation in various other sectors, 
                                                 
51
 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, p.105. 
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Sometimes this is even true for the various emirates of the UAE, as could be observed for instance during the 
Iran-Iraq war, Ibid., p.93 
54
 Ibid. p.110. 
55
 see Ibid., p.8. for the example of the UAE and its dispute with Iran. 
56
 Cooper, Power and Regionalism, p.109. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 Koch, Christian, The GCC as Regional Security Organization, KAS International Reports, available at: 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21076-544-2-30.pdf?101110141517 [accessed 31.12.2012]. 
59
 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, pp.76-77. 
60
 Cooper, Power and Regionalism, p.109. 
61
 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, p.76. 
62
 Ibid., pp.79-80. 
63
 Ibid., p.81. 
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including the military field, internal security cooperation clearly has “evolved beyond 
symbolism”.64  
3.4 Summary 
 
As we have seen the GCC as an organization is heavily influenced by the similar political 
culture of its constituents, especially by their monarchical systems, by their problematic 
relationships towards each other and by their common wish to retain their sovereignty, their 
power and the status quo in the face of shared threats. 
Nevertheless, the GCC is definitely more than a mere “council of rulers”. It possesses a 
substantial institutional structure and the GCC states cooperate in a wide array of policy 
fields to a significant degree, despite the many problems the organization and its cooperation 
efforts face.   
While economic integration is an important aspect of the GCC and featured prominently in 
official statements from its foundations,65 security cooperation seems to be the focus of the 
organization, the less developed area of military coordination as well as the more fleshed out 
cooperation between the internal security services. Therefore Joseph Twinam assumptions 
definitely holds true that “[i]n a broader sense, of course, security was”, and still is, “what the 
Gulf Cooperation was all about.”66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64
 Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf, p.84. 
65
 Twinam, The Gulf, Cooperation and the Council, p.12 
66
 Ibid., p.13. 
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4. Theoretical Foundations in Realist Thinking 
 
But how can the emergence of an organization like this and progress in the level of 
cooperation between the involved states be accounted for? As mentioned in the introduction, 
a theory-based empirical approach to this question will be followed. The aim of the following 
chapter will therefore be to provide the necessary theoretical groundwork for this analysis. It 
will start with an explanation for the use of neorealism as the best-suited school of thought to 
analyze this cooperation, followed by two subchapters devoted respectively to neorealist 
theories concerned with external conditions as drivers of regional integration and to those 
theories which try to broaden this more classical approach by also including domestic 
conditions in their examination of the reasons for regional cooperation. While neorealism of 
course is an extensive school of thought with various competing currents and ideas, this 
thesis will mainly concentrate on the works of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. 
4.1 Neorealism  – A suitable theory for the GCC 
 
The idea to refer to neorealist thinking to explain a regional integration organization may 
seem surprising at first glance due to several neorealist rationales. The essentials of 
neorealism can be described as such: Sovereign states are the most important actors in 
international relations, acting in an international system that is characterized by anarchy, i.e. 
the absence of a sufficiently strong power to act as a regulative factor. This nature of the 
international systems determines the behavior of states. Developed on the background of the 
Cold War, neorealism stresses that, given the anarchic structure of the international system, 
states are primarily concerned with their security, i.e. their survival and the protection of their 
integrity in a threatening setting. Contrastingly, their internal composition has no influence 
on their conduct in international relations, i.e. states are effectively treated as black boxes, 
whose main priorities can be described in terms of power and the pursuing of their interests 
in comparison to other states. Given their ignorance regarding the intentions of these other 
states, they always have to fear these intentions as potentially dangerous, and therefore have 
to acquire sufficient means to defend themselves. In this context, cooperation among states 
becomes highly problematic: The imperative for states in the international system is to 
maximize their own power and security67 without dependency or reliance on other states who 
are always under the suspicion to prove themselves unreliable or treacherous partners once 
                                                 
67
 Whether power or security maximization is the goal of states is an disputed demand between the so called 
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they see benefits for their own security in this course of action. “The international imperative 
is: ‘take care of yourself’”,68 as Kenneth Waltz, one of the founding fathers of neorealism put 
it. For these reasons neorealism is usually very averse to contemplate the idea of lasting 
cooperation and integration between states, or groups of states, beyond the formation of 
short-lived defense alliances and is highly skeptical towards the durability of resulting 
organizational structures,69 making it an unusual point of origin for the theoretical foundation 
of a thesis like this.70 
However, traditional integration theories like neo-functionalism, built on the example of the 
European integration, seem to only have limited applicability to extra-European settings. That 
is the reason why, in order to explain the so-called second wave of regional integration, 
starting in the 1980s around the world, of which the GCC forms one example, scholars have 
used “much more diverse theoretical vantage points”.71 “[T]he insertion of realism into the 
debate”72 was one aspect of these new approaches. Despite mounting criticism in recent years, 
especially since the end of the Cold War, neorealism is still a valuable theory for the post-
Cold War world situation as for instance Carlo Masala has argued,73 and for various reasons 
realist and neorealist theories are indeed well suited for the explanation of regional 
integration in the context of the GCC.  
Given the conflict-ridden nature of the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular, and 
the resulting prominence of security issues in the GCC states, neorealism with its focus on 
these factors seems like the most fitting theory school to explain their behavior in the 
international system. Indeed, “[i]f realism cannot explain patterns of regional cooperation in 
the ‘dog eat dog’ world of the modern Middle East, it is hard to believe that it can provide a 
generally convincing explanation for regionalism.”74 
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Secondly, the aforementioned fact that foreign policy in the Arab Gulf monarchies lies in the 
hand of a small group of individuals, who usually do not have to take the opinions of 
economic and societal actors within their states into consideration for their decision-making, 
the neorealist view of states as black boxes is not as problematic as in the case of other states.  
On a last note for the argument of neorealism as a fitting theory for an analysis of Gulf 
politics, the focus on security issues is not just widespread among scholars of Gulf politics, 
but it also features predominantly in the minds of foreign policy makers in the GCC.75 
This explains, why neorealism is one of the main analytical currents in the various attempts 
to explain the evolution of the GCC, but nevertheless one should also note the shortcomings 
and boundaries it has even in a Middle Eastern setting. One strand of criticism of neorealism 
has noted the problems it has to explain the occurrence of dynamic developments and drastic 
upheavals.76 For instance, neorealism would not have been able in any way to predict or 
explain the appearance of the Arab Spring protests in 2010/11. Furthermore, neorealism also 
has difficulties with the explanation of sub-state actors and their role in politics, which is of 
course extremely problematic given the enormous consequences the emergence of terrorist 
groups had on the Gulf region during the last decades. Effectively these two points of 
criticism can be combined to the conclusion that the main obstacle for neorealism to be a 
comprehensive theory of Gulf politics and of regional integration in the Gulf region is the 
notion of states as black boxes. This is the reason why, after looking in a first part of the 
following chapter at theories which try to explain regional integration by an analysis of 
traditional neorealist external factors, it will subsequently be tried to broaden the theoretical 
viewpoint of this thesis by including neorealist authors and ideas that also take internal 
factors as drivers of regional integration into account. As will be argued, this is not a breach 
with - or an abandonment of - neorealism, but is absolutely within the boundaries of this 
school of thought, and, in some ways, a logical step towards the enhancement of its 
explanatory power.  
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4.2 Neorealist Alliance Theory - External Threats as drivers of 
Regional Integration 
 
So what does neorealism offer for an explanation of the cooperation of the six Arab Gulf 
monarchies in the GCC? On a first glance not that much, as the two main authors on whom 
this thesis is going to concentrate in these considerations, Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt, 
do not address regional integration organizations directly in their works, and the issue has not 
generally featured prominently in neorealist thinking over the last decades.  
However, one of the key phenomena that neorealism tries to explain is the formation of 
alliances among states. 
While the GCC, as seen above, is definitely more than a simple alliance between states and 
its leaders have often rejected this term in the description of their organization, 77  the 
prevalence of security issues nevertheless shows that the GCC shares several characteristics 
with conventional alliances. At least for the sake of these theoretical considerations we can 
therefore assume that the reasons and conditions that led to the development of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council are comparable to those that cause the formation of alliances, and 
therefore neorealist alliance theories are applicable to account for the formation of the GCC.78 
Classical neorealism explains the formation of alliances by referring to the concept of a 
balance of power, as Kenneth Waltz in his fundamental works on neorealism perceives it as 
the driving force that compels states to form alliances. A balance of power is desirable for 
states as only under the conditions of such a balance of power a security system can be stable, 
as it deters potential aggressors.79 Stephen Walt in his works, on which the following chapter 
will focus, modifies this view and replaces the idea of a balance of power with the concept of 
a balance of threats, of which power only constitutes one aspect. Before a closer look at this 
concept and the way it affects the behavior of states and their alliance preferences and 
priorities is taken, it might be helpful to examine the exact definition of a threat. 
Walt identifies four factors influencing the “level of threat” 80 one state poses: “aggregate 
power, geographic proximity, offensive power, and aggressive intentions.”81 
Aggregate power can be measured in traditional categories of power, i.e. the amount of 
resources, be they in terms of population, of military and economic capabilities or 
technological, a state has at his disposal. “Because the ability to project power declines with 
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distance,”82 geographic proximity is a second element of the level of threat. States are more 
likely to perceive another state as threatening when it is located in their neighborhood. The 
third component of a threat is closely related to these two: Offensive Power. Walt defines it 
as “the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an 
acceptable cost.”83 The last factor of a threatening state are its  aggressive intentions, i.e. 
whether it is perceived by the other states as harboring aggressive and offensive tendencies 
towards them.84 
A combination of these four factors determines the level of threat of a state in the 
international system. It cannot be determined which of the four sources of threat is the most 
important one, as “one can say only that all of them are likely to play a role.”85  
According to Stephen Walt alliances “are most commonly viewed as a response to threats, 
yet there is sharp disagreement as to what that response will be.”86 Two strategic options are 
available to states which see themselves threatened by another state, and these two options 
differ sharply in their preconditions, motivations and outcomes. 
The first strategy can be subsumed under the term balancing. Balancing describes the idea 
that states, when they are facing a threatening state, form or “join alliances to protect 
themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.”87 If they 
would not form an alliance to counterbalance a potentially hegemonic state, they would risk 
their survival in an anarchic world.88 They therefore join weaker states in an alliance against 
the stronger side. In the words of Kenneth Waltz, “[s]econdary states, if they are free to 
choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker 
side they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they 
form achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from 
attacking.”89 
The antithetic strategy to balancing is described as bandwagoning behavior. The basic idea 
behind this approach is that “states are attracted to strength”.90 They are more likely to ally 
with the stronger side, i.e. a powerful and threatening state, than with its weaker opponents. 
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Bandwagoning is rooted in an appeasement policy, as “by aligning with an ascendant state or 
coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack by diverting it elsewhere.”91 
While we can therefore say that “the greater the threat, the greater the probability that the 
vulnerable state will seek an alliance“,92 it is unclear which of these two strategies states 
pursue. Traditional neorealist authors like Waltz mainly follow the idea of states that are 
balancing against stronger powers in their wish to establish the above mentioned ideal 
condition of a balance of power. As Stephen Walt in The Origins of Alliances concentrates on 
threats according to the four mentioned criteria, whether states show balancing or 
bandwagoning behavior is also partially rooted in the nature of the threat they are facing. 
Aggregate power, geographic proximity and offensive power capabilities are more or less 
neutral in this aspect and can cause both balancing and bandwagoning behavior, and which of 
them prevails depends on the situation of the involved countries.93 For instance, offensive 
power usually offers strong incentives for other states to show balancing behavior, but if the 
offensive capabilities of the threatening state are so overwhelming that they “permit[...] rapid 
conquest, vulnerable states may see little hope in resisting.”94 In this scenario balancing is no 
longer a viable option, as potential allies might not be able to help quickly enough in the 
event of an attack.95 The result is bandwagoning behavior that accounts for the creation of a 
sphere of influence around a threatening country with a high amount of offensive power.  
The fourth component of a threat, aggressive intention, is different in this aspect, as it causes 
an inherent preference for concerned states towards balancing behavior. The incentives for 
bandwagoning behavior are eliminated if a state is “believed to be unalterably aggressive”,96 
because in this case its intentions cannot be changed by allying with it and any form of 
appeasement would be a pointless, lost cause. “Thus the more aggressive or expansionist a 
state appears to be, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing coalition.”97 
So which strategy do states follow more often? Given the fact that bandwagoning is 
dangerous due to the insurmountable uncertainty regarding the benevolent intentions of a 
threatening state, balancing is the norm in international relations. 98  Bandwagoning is 
prevalent only when the concerned states are very weak in comparison to the threatening one, 
if no potential allies are available or if they defect from the perceived losing side during times 
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of war.99 As Walt has shown in his examination of Middle Eastern alliance patterns, this is 
true for the Arab world too, where “balancing is far more common than bandwagoning.”100 
Furthermore, Middle Eastern regional powers usually balance against threats in their 
neighborhood by other regional actors, and are indifferent towards the global power 
distribution.101 They often follow the most usual form of alliance formation, by trying “to 
counter threats by adding the power of another state to their own”,102 be they superpowers or 
other regional states.  
Walt mentions the Gulf Cooperation Council as one of the prominent examples of balancing 
in reaction to a foreign threat,103 and it will be one task of the empirical part of this thesis to 
examine whether or not this claim proves true and the foundation and extension of 
cooperation within the framework of the GCC can in fact be seen as balancing behavior by 
the involved states. 
4.3. Opening the black box – Domestic Threats as drivers of 
Regional Integration 
 
However, focusing this thesis solely on these ideas is a potentially very limited approach and 
may fall short in the explanation of many important drivers and motivations behind the 
emergence of the GCC, as it completely excludes the wide array of domestic factors that may 
well have been equally important, or may even have dominated.104 Therefore, the following 
chapter will open up the black box of the state and look at conditions in the internal 
composition of states that may account for increased cooperation between states in the Gulf.  
Some clarifications regarding the neorealist nature of these approaches are necessary. For 
Kenneth Waltz, the international system itself and the international anarchy is the third level 
of analysis or “image”, as he calls them, after the first two, ‘subsystemic’ levels, the 
individual human behavior and the internal structure of states.105 It is from the nature and 
structure of the international system – the systemic level – that neorealism draws its most 
important and most basic assumptions regarding the behavior of states. Therefore, all 
attempts to introduce subsystemic elements into the analysis have drawn criticism on them 
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and have been accused by some neorealist authors to contribute to a degeneration of 
neorealism.106 But, as for instance Carlo Masala has commented, one important aspect of 
Waltz’s theories is overlooked in these accounts: That it is an attempt to explain several 
characteristics of the international system, but that it cannot - and does not even have the 
intention - to explain the foreign policy of specific states.107 As Waltz himself has noted, it is 
necessary for some problems, e.g. the analysis of the specific foreign policy of a nation, to 
take a look at the “internal dispositions”108 of individual states,109 i.e. to open up the black 
box. As exactly this is the intention of this thesis, this step is necessary for the analysis and 
does not run counter to the neorealist basics of this work. 
In this it is in good companionship, as many works of authors describing themselves as 
neorealists have included some form of subsystemic factors in their analysis, causing Andrew 
Moravcsik and Jeffrey Legro to pose the question “Is anybody still a realist?”110 111  On 
authors like this the following considerations will be based, in which I will focus on the 
classical works of Stephen Walt112 and a more recent account of Scott Cooper and Brock 
Taylor.113 
For the aspect of domestic threats as factor of alliance formation and therefore regional 
integration in the GCC, it is necessary to put aside global characteristics and conditions about 
alliance formations and to have a look at key characteristics of the involved states, i.e. Arab 
conservative monarchies. The idea that like-minded states, i.e. states with a similar internal 
structure and a similar ideological basis are more likely to bond features in realist theories 
dating back up to Hans Morgenthau’s concept of ideological solidarity.114 Walt identifies one 
part of the logic behind this widely-held belief in the idea, that “alignment with similar states 
may enhance the legitimacy of a weak regime by demonstrating that it is part of a large, 
popular movement.”115 Hereby the term legitimacy enters the picture, a key concept whose 
importance can hardly be overestimated for Arab states in general and Arab monarchies in 
particular, as a high degree of legitimacy for their rule is one of the key assets that allows 
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monarchical rulers to keep the power in their country firmly in their hand and their grip on 
their societies intact.116  
Walt points out that, unlike socialism and pan-Arabism, a common monarchical identity is 
one of the “unifying ideologies” in international relations, as monarchical legitimacy is based 
“on the traditional or divine right of kings. Because the principles of monarchical [...] rule 
grant legitimate authority over one’s own domain but imply no such authority over the 
domain of others, alliances between monarchies [...] are not torn by ideological conflicts.”117 
On the contrary, monarchies are able to collaborate in order to strengthen their respective 
legitimacy and popularity, and are especially prone to do so if their legitimacy is under 
pressure. As Walt puts it, if regimes feel weak or unstable they “may try to enhance their 
popularity (and attract external support) by seeking membership in a large and popular 
movement”.118 “States lacking domestic legitimacy will be more likely to seek ideological 
alliances to increase internal and external support.”119 They have an “interest in collaborating 
to oppose any movements that do threaten their legitimacy”,120 and  therefore “we can expect 
regimes whose legitimacy is precarious to enter ideologically based alliances”. 121  The 
principal source of solidarity among monarchies is in this point of view the common “threat 
from revolutionary movements”.122  
Since ideological movements, if they are striving for the downfall of a specific political order, 
“can pose every bit as significant a threat as that posed by military power”,123 they can also 
trigger balancing alliance behavior by concerned states. 124  In fact, “many ideological 
alliances may just be balancing alliances in disguise if they have been formed to oppose the 
spread of a hostile ideology.”125 The more stable the general security situation is, the more 
important these ideological considerations become in the formation of alliances. Under a very 
direct military threat, states are more prone to take any available alliance partners despite 
ideological differences.126 It will be one of the primary goals of my case studies to examine if 
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these assumptions are able to withstand an empirical test and were one of the key motivations 
behind the formation of the GCC. 
Cooper and Taylor in their article Power and Regionalism also argue along this line, but 
bring several new approaches into the debate. In their perception, the main flaw in Walt’s 
Balance-of-threat theory is its “mischaracteriz[ation of] the GCC as primarily an alliance”,127 
and it therefore has failed to catch the “hybrid nature of the GCC”,128 with its strong degree 
of economic cooperation alongside the military sector.129 They discard the view of the GCC 
as essentially an alliance by pointing out the limited progress in the actual implementation of 
the far-fetched goals in this sector, and also provide an explanation for this. 
They develop the argument that the emergence of the GCC “is more closely related to the 
domestic[emphasis in the original] threats facing GCC regimes than to an external [...] 
military threat.” 130  This conclusion is mainly drawn from the events surrounding the 
emergence of the GCC in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979, a case that will also 
be examined below. In this point of view the GCC is an attempt by Gulf leaders to gain 
strength through increased unity, in the face of a domestically threatening scenario. 131 
Therefore the lack of substantial military cooperation can be explained, as an extension of the 
military aspect of the GCC would run counter to the regime stability of the Gulf monarchies, 
given their traditional fear of a centralized strong military,132 and thus would not be in line 
with the key motivations behind the formation of the GCC.133 
Instead, the equally important focus of cooperation in the domestic security cooperation and 
the economic field has helped the GCC states to retain their domestic stability mainly through 
three mechanisms: by means of increased legitimacy, intelligence sharing and economic 
benefits.134  
The effect on legitimacy is similar to the one described by Walt. The Gulf community, as a 
concept that resorts to ideas about an Islamic community and a pan-Arab endeavor that 
partially undoes the division of the Gulf region by the imperialist powers, significantly 
strengthens the legitimacy of the Gulf monarchies.135 This helps the ruling regimes to retain 
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the image of legitimate leadership in the eyes of their populations and to keep themselves 
stable in turbulent and dangerous times. 
The GCC as a platform for intelligence sharing becomes an important tool for the domestic 
stability of the involved states due to the primarily transnational origin of subversive 
movements against their rule,136stemming from the strong transnational identities in the 
region.137  Prior to the formation of the GCC this seriously hampered the ability of the 
respective national security services to monitor and combat such movements, which might 
arise beyond the extent of their own national territory.138  The aforementioned extensive 
intelligence cooperation between the GCC states therefore offers the perfect opportunity for 
the monarchical regimes to keep their domestic security apparatuses effective in the 
preservation of their domestic order and their internal stability.139 
The third aspect is maybe the most interesting one: Economic benefits through cooperation as 
a way to fend of domestic threats. The GCC was “formulated to allow Gulf regimes to 
provide economic benefits to [...] their most restive populations”. 140  The distribution of 
economic benefits to their population is of paramount importance for the domestic politics of 
the rentier states and societies of the Gulf monarchies. In the wake of the oil boom 
“government welfare programs became the typical response to civil unrest.”141 However, this 
strategy is extremely expensive to maintain, especially for the smaller monarchies with only 
limited oil revenues. 142  The economic cooperation within the GCC and its regional 
investment programs are an important tool to facilitate these expenditures and to improve the 
economic opportunities of dissatisfied internal groups,  as it distributes the burdens of this 
policy on all GCC states.143 The wealthier states within the organization have an interest in 
this form of cooperation, given their common interest in the stability and maintenance of 
royal rule in all GCC states, and the fact, that a threat to one of them is a threat to all of them. 
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4.4. Summary 
 
Various conclusions can be see as the quintessence from these neorealist theoretical 
considerations. First of all, neorealism has proven itself as a valuable theory school to 
provide mechanisms and motivations for the development of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
Especially the idea of a balancing reaction at the basis of the emergence of the GCC has 
explanatory potential. 
The first hypothesis gained from this chapter is therefore that the GCC states engaged in 
regional cooperation in a balancing reaction to rising threats to their common security and to 
the survival of their regimes. 
Secondly, this balancing is not just directed against direct external threats from other states, 
but also directed against problematic domestic groups and threatening transnational 
ideologies. From these two points of origin a general hypothesis regarding the pattern of 
cooperation within the framework of the GCC can be deduced: If the level of threat for the 
Gulf monarchies, be it from within or without, rises, their willingness to cooperate and to 
agree to further integration efforts increases. Opposed to this, we can also assume an 
antithetic correlation between the level of threat and cooperation: Once the level of threat 
recedes and the immediate danger has passed, the monarchies might be more inclined to 
rediscover the importance of their national sovereignty as the incentives to cooperate are 
decreasing, resulting in the delay or abandonment of initiatives for closer integration within 
the GCC.144 
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5. Case studies 
 
Are these theoretical assumptions valid explanations for the actual historical proceedings that 
led to development in the GCC? As a full analysis of the three decades of the existence of the 
GCC would go way beyond the scope of this thesis, a case studies approach which has a 
closer look at two selected time periods is the best way to test the validity of the assumptions. 
The first case that will be examined is the time before, during and immediately after the 
emergence of the GCC as an organization in 1981, as it is maybe the most telling example of 
the correlation between times of external and domestic threats and the resulting increasing 
cooperation between the Gulf monarchies. As the formulation of the description of these case 
studies already shows, it is also beyond the scope of this thesis to try to show a direct 
empirical causality between these two factors. Given the immense scope of the involved 
actors, interests and objectives, the identification of a pattern of correlation seems a sufficient 
and more achievable aim. 
But this thesis is not just an examination of threats as factors for the formation of the GCC, it 
also tries to show that these patterns did not just disappear once the common organization 
was formed and that they are still the dominant drivers behind the success and failure of 
integration initiatives in the region. Therefore a second, more recent case study seems to be 
necessary. Several potential time periods come to mind, most notably the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf war,145 the instability in Iraq after the US 
intervention of 2003, the resulting unrest and civil-war like situation in the country and the 
emergence of a Shi’a dominated government, the unresolved dispute over the Iranian nuclear 
program and the increasing threat of transnational terrorism since the 9/11 attacks, committed 
mostly by citizens of GCC states.146 However, the last epoch-making chain of events in the 
Middle East, most commonly referred to in the West as the Arab Spring of 2010/11, appears 
to offer the most interesting insights into the functioning of the Gulf Cooperation Council and 
furthermore has the advantage of being the most recent example of a threatening situation 
that had tremendous implications for the GCC. 
Both case studies will start with a short outline of the historical setting and events, will assess 
the general nature of the international and domestic threat for the Gulf monarchies and will 
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show what practical implications they had on the GCC with a description of the way 
integration between GCC states changed in the relevant time period.  
 
5.1 Containing the Revolution - The Emergence of the GCC 
 
5.1.1 The General Situation 
 
What can be called a Gulf Regional Security System147 emerged with the end of British 
dominance in the region after the Second World War, and gained its full complexity with the 
independence of the smaller Arab monarchies from Britain in 1961 (Kuwait) and 1971 
(Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the emirates of the UAE). The security situation of the Gulf was 
characterized by its tripolar structure within the global bipolar Cold War: Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Iraq were the principal powers in the region and tried to gain influence in the arising 
power vacuum left behind after the British withdrawal and the American unwillingness to 
adopt a similar role in the region.148 
The monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia, loosely connected by their pro-Western attitude 
and their general contentedness with the status quo149 formed the so called twin pillars, on 
which the western hopes for stability in the region lasted. Ba’athist Iraq, with close 
connections to the Soviet Union and dedicated to the cause of Arab nationalism was the main 
opponent to this arrangement until 1975, when it took a more accommodating stance towards 
Iran and the Gulf monarchies. Thus, all major states in the region, while mistrust and 
hostilities were recurrent, were dedicated to the general goal of stability, respected their 
respective legitimacy and did not try to undermine their domestic stability. In this 
constellation, the Shah’s Iran played the dominant part and could usually achieve its goals, 150  
functioning as a “regional policeman.”151 With the exception of the Dhufar rebellion in Oman, 
which could only be subdued in 1975, the result was a predominantly stable situation 
throughout most of the decade, which oversaw an unprecedented rise in the wealth of the 
Golf states due to the so called oil-revolution.152  
                                                 
147
 See Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, pp. 1-15 for the argument that the Gulf Region 
constitutes a separate security system. 
148
 Ibid., pp.16-44. 
149
 Kechichian, Joseph A., The Gulf  Cooperation Council. Search for Security, in: Third World Quarterly 7, no.              
4 (1985), pp.853-881,  p.853. 
150
 Gause, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, p.6. 
151
 Ibid., p.56. 
152
 Ibid., pp.25-44. 
 27 
This period of relative stability suddenly came to an end with the epoch-making year of 1979 
and the Iranian Revolution. The Shah was overthrown in January/February 1979 and a Shi’a 
Islamic Republic was proclaimed under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. The 
neighboring Gulf states were soon to feel the reverberations of these events. 153  The 
ascendancy of a revolutionary movement to the leadership of the strongest state in the region, 
with the declared intention to export this revolution, made the twin pillar strategy collapse 
and shook the regional security system as a whole.154 
This tense situation was further intensified by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December to support their local client regime and by Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 
1980, which triggered the “longest and most devastating war in modern Middle Eastern 
history.”155 The Iran-Iraq war was to drag on until 1988, with shifting fortunes of war and 
high casualties on both sides.156 Several Gulf monarchies, with war erupting directly at their 
borders, financially supported the Iraqi side,157 and in the course of the so called Tanker war 
warfare was conducted within the waters of the Gulf itself. 
5.1.2 The Threat 
 
As this short and superficial account already shows, the Gulf monarchies faced turbulent 
times at the turn of the decade from 1979-1982. If we follow the assumption of this thesis 
that threats are the main driver of regional integration in the Gulf region, a closer 
examination of these threats is in order. Given the above mentioned situation it is obvious 
that, while various other threatening settings were also existing and the perceptions of these 
dangers varied among the GCC states,158 the Iranian revolution and subsequently the Iran-
Iraq war were the paramount threat for the Gulf monarchies during the formation period of 
the GCC.159 
For an assessment of the extent of the external threat Iran posed, we can apply Walt’s four 
constituents of a threat. In terms of geographic proximity, Iran definitely posed a potential 
threat to the GCC states, given the facts that the Gulf is merely 39 kilometers wide at its 
narrowest point, the Strait of Hormuz, and that Iran since 1971 controls several strategic 
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islands in the Gulf.160 Given the aggregate power and offensive capabilities of Iran, one has 
to state that these two factors actually were reduced by the Iranian revolution, as the 
emergent Islamist republic was entangled in serious domestic conflicts and soon on the 
defensive in its bitter and costly war with Iraq.161 Nevertheless the Iranian military was still a 
large formation and well equipped, and Iran again assessed its status as “a real military 
threat”162 with its offensives in 1981 and the successful expulsion of Iraqi forces from most 
of its territory in the following year.163 But the most important shift definitely occurred in the 
fourth factor, the aggressive intentions. As mentioned above, the new Iranian leadership soon 
declared its wish to export its revolution and its hostile intentions towards the monarchical 
regimes on the Southern shores of the Gulf.164  Furthermore Iranian politicians renewed 
territorial claims on several territories, most importantly on the island of Bahrain, which 
previously had been abandoned by the Shah.165 All things considered we can therefore state, 
that while the offensive capabilities of Iran may have been blunted in the immediate 
aftermath of the Revolution, the general level of threat posed by Iran on the GCC states 
increased to a significant degree when the Shah was overthrown. 
In the domestic field, the implications of the Islamic revolution can not be underestimated 
either. “The very fact that a mass-based, Islamist social revolution had occurred in the 
neighborhood was an implicit threat to [...] the monarchical Arab states.” 166  The general 
revival of Islam in the wake of the Revolution posed a severe menace to the Islamic 
legitimacy of the conservative monarchies,167especially since Khomeini denounced monarchy 
as a “non-Islamic"concept. 168  “In 1979 Islam with Iran as its standard-bearer appeared 
irresistible and irrepressible, an incipient tidal-wave.” 169  Therefore, while eventually all 
Iranian attempts to spread its revolutionary ideas throughout the Islamic world were 
unsuccessful, the immediate threats they posed to the domestic stability of its neighbors were 
immense. 
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5.1.3 The Implications for the development of the GCC  
 
But to what extent were these events important factors in the development of the GCC? And 
can this organization rightfully be seen as a balancing reaction against them?  
While first steps towards cooperation between the Gulf states and towards the establishment 
of a common organization to organize this cooperation date back to the 60s and 70s there is 
little doubt that the threatening setting at the turn of the decade 1979-1982 provided an 
indispensable impetus for integration and played a major factor in the realization of these 
aspirations. “The birth of the GCC was not inevitable. [...] [T]he pre-GCC tradition of 
cooperation greatly facilitated the post-GCC activities, especially in nonmilitary fields, but 
they did not in themselves provide the necessary stimulus for creating the GCC.”170  
As R.K.Ramazani has argued, the experience with domestic unrest in the aftermath of Iran’s 
Islamic Revolution constituted this necessary stimulus and therefore was “the decisive factor 
behind [the] formation”171 of the GCC, and the external threat of the First Gulf war acted as a 
“catalyst”,172 further speeding up this process. And indeed there is a marked chronological 
correlation between these two factors and progress in the negotiations towards the formation 
of the GCC. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran was proclaimed in April 1979, and the Gulf regimes were to 
feel the repercussions of this “pivot of modern Middle Eastern history”173 later this year. 
Shi’ites form a sizeable minority in Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia (where their position as a majority 
in the oil-producing Saudi eastern provinces makes them an especially important factor),174 
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, and they form the majority of the population in 
Bahrain.175 To obtain reliable data on the actual proportion of Shi’ites in the Gulf States is 
almost impossible given the deliberate opacity of the ruling Sunni regimes in these affairs, 
but nevertheless it is obvious that Shi’ites form a crucially relevant groups for the security of 
these Gulf states, especially in Bahrain and Saudi-Arabia. During the summer of 1979 Iranian 
propaganda campaigns were directed at restive population groups in the Gulf states, 176 
especially Shi’ites, and first demonstrations, in which sometimes pictures of Khomeini were 
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displayed, occurred.177 This was accompanied by open calls of Iranian high-ranking officials 
to overthrow regimes in the Gulf states.178 The demonstrations in Saudi Arabia peaked in 
November 1979 and during the first months of 1980, and were met with a heavy intervention 
by the security forces, showing the nervousness of the Saudi regime.179 At around the same 
time, similar demonstrations occurred in Kuwait180 and Bahrain.181 
The danger for the Saudi monarchy was amplified by the encroachment of Islamist ideas on 
Sunni groups. The occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Sunni fundamentalists in 
November 1979 could only be resolved after weeks of bitter fighting, an event that severely 
undermined the claim of the Saudi King to be the Custodian of the two Holy Mosques. 182 In 
reaction to these threats the Gulf monarchies not only tried to raise their own muslim 
image,183 but also embarked upon a course of closer cooperation with their neighbors. 
The first step towards the foundation of the GCC can be seen in various visits of the Kuwaiti 
prime minister (and crown prince), Saad al-Abdullah in December 1978, as domestic unrest 
reached unprecedented levels in Iran, to the other Gulf states to “discuss means of Gulf 
cooperation”,184 triggering “[i]ntensive consultation among the six”.185 In October 1979 the 
foreign ministers of the future GCC states met in Taif in Saudi Arabia to discuss issues of 
“mutual defense and political stability.”186 When the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War removed 
the issue that had hindered any previous attempts of a Gulf cooperation organization - the 
problematic but necessary exclusion of Iran and Iraq from any settlement, as they could now 
be blocked from the organization on accounts of neutrality in their armed conflict and 
because they were preoccupied with the conduct of their war  - 187 the next steps could be 
taken. On the occasion of an Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit meeting in January 
1981, again in Taif, the general decision to form the GCC was taken during informal bilateral 
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talks.188 The following month, at a conference of the foreign ministers in Riyadh, the general 
guidelines for the GCC were agreed upon, and in March, at a similar meeting in Muscat, the 
text of the GCC charter was decided upon, to be formally signed by the heads of state at the 
end of the month in Abu Dhabi. During these meetings “questions of security were high on 
the agenda of the Gulf leaders” ,189 and in May a GCC Working Paper outlined an important 
motivation behind the foundation of the GCC: “International designs will not be able to find a 
foothold in a merged region which has one voice, opinion and strength. However, they will 
be able to find a thousand footholds if this region [...] remains made up of small entities, that 
can be easily victimized.”190 While this sentence is formulated in a slightly different context, 
it does not take much fantasy to deduce that the notion of “international designs” was 
primarily directed against Iran and the Iranian attempts to fuel domestic unrest in the Gulf 
states.191 
However, these seemingly unanimous procedures should not hide the fact that there was 
serious disagreement about the question what exactly the GCC should be. Three models were 
under discussion: While Oman envisaged the GCC as a comprehensive security endeavor, 
which should maintain close ties with the West, Kuwait stressed the importance of non-
alignment in the Cold War and was to reject several attempts for cooperation in security 
affairs.192 The Saudi conception of the GCC was more or less “a middle course between the 
Omani and Kuwaiti extremes”,193 and especially emphasized the importance of collaboration 
to preserve the internal stability of the Gulf monarchies. 194  Which of these differing 
conceptions over the nature and intent of the GCC the six states were to follow shaped the 
debate during the formation years of their common organization.  
Probably due to these differing conceptions, the GCC organs during most of 1981 were 
primarily concerned with the introduction of a wide array of cooperation, mainly in the 
economic field and in the coordination of their foreign policy in pan-Arab issues.195 Security 
issues and cooperation in this field were however soon to return to the agenda, as the level of 
threat reached its highest peak after the 1979 events in the autumn of 1981, which was to 
cause a marked shift of the GCC towards security cooperation as the most important aspect of 
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the organization.196 The threat was twofold: First of all, Iran in September started its first 
offensive,197 which, while not yet as successful as those of the next year, already provided a 
warning signal to the Gulf regimes. But, more importantly, in December 1981 plans by a 
militant group with allegedly close ties to the Iranian regime were discovered to overthrow 
the ruling regime in Bahrain.198 After this event “[c]oordination among the Gulf monarchies 
on security issues at both the bilateral and the GCC levels intensified.”199 The failed coup 
d’état made the Bahraini leadership, previously “devout disciples of the political and 
economic aspects of Gulf cooperation, ‘reborn’ in their enthusiasm for the security 
aspects.”200 The immediate reaction was a plea by the General Secretary of the GCC towards 
closer cooperation in the face of subversive Iranian efforts201 and the conclusion of bilateral 
internal security agreements between Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states with the 
exception of Kuwait.202 The negative response of Kuwait to a similar agreement, probably 
caused by the fear that it might endanger the relatively open nature of the Kuwaiti political 
system, was the reason why such an agreement could not be achieved on the GCC level and 
that Saudi proposals to that effect were not accepted.203 “The net effect was a working GCC 
internal security arrangement, with a Kuwaiti reservation as to making it formal.”204 Kuwait 
was later to give up its opposition in this matter and to comply with comprehensive GCC 
internal security efforts after an 1985 assassination attempt against its ruler and a series of 
bomb attacks205 demonstrated its vulnerability to internal subversion.206 It also changed its 
averse position towards military cooperation once the Tanker War in the Gulf increasingly 
became dangerous,207 and the military occupation of the island of Faw at its border reinforced 
the Iranian threat.208 
After the Bahrain coup attempt economic cooperation was strengthened during 1982 and in 
November 1982 the Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) was established.209 These steps can 
be seen as an attempt to improve the economic lot of underprivileged populations groups in 
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order to prevent their radicalization, a factor which is especially important among the 
impoverished Shi’a population of Bahrain, 210  as these measures “would be expected to 
benefit Shiites disproportionately”.211 “Just as the perceived threats to internal and external 
security of the GCC states impelled them to cooperate in coping with acts of terrorism and in 
deterring the spread of war, these threats drove them to cooperate in integrating their 
economies.”212 
While first Omani proposals for military cooperation were still rebuffed in 1981, they were 
soon revived as “the neighborhood grew more threatening.”213 The Iranian offensives against 
Iraq in September 1981, and more importantly, in the spring of 1982, which led to the almost 
complete expulsion of Iraqi troops from Iranian soil214  were to result in “unprecedented 
efforts at defense cooperation among the GCC members”215 In combination with the Bahraini 
coup attempt this resulted in the first meeting of the GCC defense ministers in January 1982, 
laying in the words of the GCC general secretary “the first brick in the foundation [of defense 
cooperation] and forg[ing] the tool for the edifice that will safeguard the security and stability 
of the Gulf”.216 First joint military exercises, with the participation of reluctant Kuwait, took 
place in 1983.217 Throughout the duration of the Iran-Iraq war, which was to last until 1988 
and which increasingly affected the GCC states, defense cooperation was to increase step by 
step.218 Therefore it can be safely stated, that “the Iraq-Iran war acted as the primary catalyst 
for strengthening the GCC’s defense and deterrence capability.”219 
5.1.4 Summary 
 
As we have seen in this case study of the founding years of the GCC, there is a marked 
general correlation between times of external and internal threats and cooperation efforts in 
the GCC as well as there are several examples of important policy changes of GCC states 
towards closer cooperation in reaction to specific threatening events. 
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Regarding the idea that cooperation between the GCC states was to decline once the 
imminent threat has passed, it is difficult to establish whether this is true or not. While the 
lack of any substantial new efforts after the first few years and the problems with the 
implementation of many decided cooperation efforts seem to point in the direction of a 
dwindling impetus for regional integration, this could also be attributed to general start-up 
problems with integration in the first years of an emerging organization or to the notion that 
consolidation was in order after the fast efforts in the foundation period. Furthermore it is 
doubtful that the perceived threat for the GCC states really decreased in the decade after its 
foundation. The war between Iraq and Iran dragged on until 1988, and merely two years later 
Iraq was to occupy Kuwait, triggering another Gulf War in 1991. On the domestic scene, Iran 
continued to follow its idea to export its revolution until the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1989, after which his successors embarked upon a more conciliatory course.220  
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5.2 Deepening Ties in Troubled Times – The Arab Spring 2011 and 
the GCC 
 
5.2.1 The Situation 
 
As we have seen the theory of balancing behavior against external and domestic threats has a 
certain explanatory power for the emergence of the GCC as an organization in the early 
1980s. The following chapter will now try to assess whether the same factors are still at play 
in the current GCC.  An analysis of the most recent security threat to the Gulf regimes, posed 
by the so called Arab Spring of 2010/11 might help to contribute to an answer to this question. 
While several of the developments throughout the decade after the year 2000 certainly were 
worrying to the stability of the Gulf monarchies, none of them posed a life-threatening 
menace to the stability of the monarchical regimes. The Arab Spring, triggering the only 
large-scale national uprising in a Gulf state in modern history therefore was without a doubt 
the greatest threat to this stability in the new century and the most direct one since the 
occupation of Kuwait in 1991. 
A short overview of what happened in the last two years might be in order and necessary to 
really grasp the nature of this threat. In mid-December 2010 the self-immolation of the young 
street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in the small town of Sidi Bourani, Tunisia was to break the 
relative calmness of the Arab world’s political landscape. A small demonstration organized 
on the next day soon spread, and after merely two weeks Tunisia’s president Ben Ali, who 
had ruled the country for 23 years, had to flee into exile in Saudi Arabia.221  But the wave of 
unrest, in most cases characterized by accusations of widespread corruption, demands for a 
greater degree of democratic participation and economic demands, soon spread across the 
Tunisian borders, and in the following months almost every Arab country from Oman to 
Morocco experienced the emergence of protest movements, albeit the strength of these 
protests and their outcome varied drastically. At the end of January and by the beginning of 
February, a successful transition took place in Egypt, the most populous Arab country. While 
the transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and - to a somewhat lesser degree - 222 in Yemen in the 
beginning of 2011 were successful and took place without greater bloodshed, the protests in 
Syria, Libya and Bahrain that started in February and March 2011 met a stronger resistance 
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by the endangered regimes they tried to topple. The Libyan struggle led to a NATO 
intervention that put an end to the Ghaddafi regime, Syria was plunged into an ongoing 
unresolved civil-war and the popular movement in Bahrain in March 2011 was to be the only 
large-scale Arab Spring protest that was successfully put down by security forces. 223 
5.2.2 The Threat 
 
That these events posed a danger to the Gulf monarchies is doubtless, but what was its nature? 
As the matter at hand is a wave of protest movements, it is manifest that the main aspect has 
to be seen in the field of domestic politics. The only external factors that may have come into 
play were the prospect of a shift in the regional power system with the potential of rising 
tensions between Egypt and Israel after the overthrow of the Mubarak regime and the 
eventuality of a proliferation of the Syrian Civil war to neighboring countries, for instance 
into Jordan. As not even these potential disturbances would have had a direct impact on the 
Gulf states it becomes obvious that the idea of external threats as factors for regional 
integration in the GCC in the time period of the Arab Spring can be rightfully dismissed. 
In contrast, the domestic threat could be seen as severe. The overthrow of autocratic rulers 
throughout the Arab World, even in neighboring Yemen, certainly posed a warning signal to 
the autocratic rulers of the Gulf, especially as unrest soon spread into the GCC itself. In 
addition to the large-scale protest movement in Bahrain in February/March 2011, Kuwait and 
Oman have experienced larger demonstrations during the last two years, while the internal 
situation of the other member states appeared to be calm on the surface. 224  But even in Saudi 
Arabia calls for a “Day of Rage” in March 2011 were heard, although they never materialized 
in the face of enormous security measures and the resistance of the Wahhabi religious 
establishment.225  
All in all, considering the revolutionary, partially republican,226 movement in Bahrain right at 
the doorstep of the other GCC states, the fear that it was inspired by Iran227 or that the 
mechanisms of the rentier state, that had kept Gulf societies stable in the past showed first 
                                                 
223
 For a very helpful and comprehensive overview of the Arab Spring protests see the many accounts provided 
in Pollack, Kenneth M., Byman, Daniel L., Al-Turk, Akram, et.al. (ed.), The Arab Awakening. America and the 
Transformation of the Middle East, Washington D.C., 2011. 
224
 Maloney, Suzanne, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. The Nervous Bystanders, in: Pollack, Kenneth M., 
Byman, Daniel L., Al-Turk, Akram, et.al. (ed.), The Arab Awakening. America and the Transformation of the 
Middle East, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2011, pp.180-183. 
225
 Riedel, Saudi Arabia, p.160. 
226
 Al Jazeera, Calls for end to Bahrain monarchy, 2011, available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/20113924218214336.html [accessed 31.12.2012]. 
227
 Doran, Michael S. And Sheikh, Salman, Bahrain, Island of Troubles, in: Pollack, Kenneth M., Byman, 
Daniel L., Al-Turk, Akram, et.al. (ed.), The Arab Awakening. America and the Transformation of the Middle 
East, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 2011, p.188. 
 37 
cracks as population groups demonstrated in the “culmination of economic, social, and 
political grievances”228 and the fact that several domestic problems within the GCC states 
resembled those that had caused Arab Spring protests in other states,229 the Arab Spring 
definitely constituted a major domestic threat for the monarchical regimes in the GCC states.   
5.2.3 The Reaction 
 
The security threat on the Gulf States urged Gulf leaders to take action in order to secure their 
regime stability and, as the following account tries to show, their reaction to this threat was to 
be swift, largely successful and had a serious effect on the nature of cooperation through the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. Before I start with these observations, two remarks regarding the 
problems with this case study are in order. First of all, the short temporal distance between 
the events of the Arab Spring and this thesis brings several problems with it: To begin with, 
while a lot has been written on the Arab Spring, there still is a certain lack of reliable and 
comprehensive secondary literature on the subject matter for which reason the inclusion of 
various other sources, sometimes problematic and potentially biased, is necessary. However, 
this evidence, mainly gained from Gulf newspapers, should be sufficient for an analysis of 
the general tendencies of Gulf cooperation this thesis is interested in. Secondly, as parts of 
the events covered in the following account are still unraveling, the delimitation of the period 
under consideration becomes difficult. Mainly for reasons of practicality rather than for 
objective reasons, this thesis will only include events up to November 2012. The second 
major problem with the proximity of this case study can be seen in the fact that many of the 
addressed events are still critical for regime survival of the GCC states, a fact that increases 
the usual opacity of the Gulf monarchies to even higher levels, making an analysis of the 
underlying factors very difficult. But regardless of these problems several interesting insights 
can be gained by an analysis of the reaction of the GCC to the Arab Spring movement.  
Cooperation between the GCC states in the 21st century up to the Arab Spring was for the 
most part shaped by economic integration, but, “despite regular declarations of brotherly love 
at expensive summits, the GCC’s plans for further integration have been hampered for years 
by political tensions between the member states.”230 The threat of the Arab Spring was to 
change both, when it entered the Gulf area with the first demonstrations occurring in Bahrain 
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in February 2011. During the next weeks, according to estimations, more than 150.000 
Bahrainis  took to the streets,231 a tremendous number in relation to the total population of the 
island of only about 1.2 million.232 The demonstrators tried to emulate the events on Cairo’s 
Tahrir Square by occupying the so called Pearl Roundabout in Manama, placed around a 
monument that ironically had been erected on the occasion of the 1982 GCC Summit meeting 
in the island state. The very same organization was soon to put an end to the Bahraini 
opposition movement. At the beginning of March, after violent clashes, Saudi and Emirati 
troops under the command of the Peninsula Shield Force entered Bahrain after a plea of the 
Bahraini government and helped the security forces to put down the unrest. In this successful 
crackdown 45 died and about 1500 were arrested. 233  The Pearl monument was torn down in 
the middle of March. 
This direct intervention was not the only step the GCC States undertook to contain the Arab 
Spring. With various measures the conservative Gulf governments tried to control the 
situation in their own countries and throughout the Arab world, a process that some observers 
dubbed the “Saudi-led Counterrevolution” to the Arab Spring,234 despite the fact that the 
GCC countries actually supported Arab Spring protests in various states.235 And without a 
doubt, when it came to their own countries, the GCC monarchies took no chances to prevent 
uprisings with “a mix of economic handouts, use of patronage, limited political and economic 
reforms as well as domestic repression”.236  
But one part of these measures was not domestic but transnational and partially characterized 
by increased activity in the framework of the GCC. In May 2011, as the organization was 
celebrating its 30th birthday, proposals were made by GCC leaders to strive for the inclusion 
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of Jordan and Morocco into the organization.237 These two countries, the only two remaining 
Arab monarchies not yet organized in the GCC, were both under pressure from protest 
movements in their country and, together with the offer of membership, received 
considerable financial aid by the GCC states to strengthen their regime stability.238 As the 
inclusion of Jordan and Morocco can be seen as an attempt to not only “defend[...] the 
monarch in power but also their monarchical system of rule”, 239  thereby retaining the 
legitimacy of monarchy as an acceptable form of government in the Arab world,  the attempt 
of May 2012 to form this “coalition of the trembling”240 is an important piece of evidence to 
show the correlation between threats, the search for legitimacy, balancing behavior and the 
formation and development of the GCC.  
But also apart from these attempts to turn the GCC into the club of all like-minded Sunni 
Arab monarchies, several important integration efforts have been made between the six 
existing GCC states during the last two years. The 32nd GCC Summit meeting in Riyadh in 
December 2011, already mentioned in the introduction of this thesis provided a major step in 
this development. It announced the so called Riyadh Declaration, stating that the GCC 
monarchies ”are aware of the changes, challenges and threats facing the countries of the 
council, redrawing the situation in the region and targeting the links binding them”241 and 
declaring that this “situation requires cementing ranks, unifying views and mobilizing joint 
energies.“242 In line with these considerations the Riyadh Declaration called for the adoption 
of King Abdullah’s proposal “to move beyond the stage of cooperation to the stage of 
union”243 , for limited political reform in the member states, for “the highest degrees of 
economic cooperation [...] and [for] overcom[ing] the obstacles that obstruct the march of 
achievement of the customs union, monetary union and the common market.”244 Furthermore 
it stressed the importance of an increase in diplomatic cooperation and the “development of 
defense and security cooperation”.245  
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The Riyadh declaration obviously forms the answer of the Gulf Cooperation Council towards 
the Arab Spring and shows their reaction to this domestic threat: increased cooperation. 
During the last two years, several concrete steps were taken by the GCC monarchs in this 
direction. Probably most important was the increase in internal security cooperation. A new 
security agreement, originally worked out in 1994 but delayed ever since, was renegotiated 
and signed by the six interior ministers at a meeting in Bahrain in November 2012.246 Under 
the terms of this agreement a comprehensive information exchange between the respective 
security services was agreed upon, together with several other far-reaching points of 
collaboration.247 Kuwait, worried that the agreement would infringe on its more developed 
parliamentary system and its constitution, in a surprising move decided to sign the paper 
despite these concerns.248 This can probably be seen as a reaction to a wave of large-scale 
demonstrations that occurred in the country in November 2012.249 In May 2012 the GCC 
leaders furthermore decided to evaluate the possibility of a joint GCC police force to be 
introduced in the future.250 
In addition to this marked increase in efforts of domestic cooperation, the field of military 
cooperation also experienced several important developments in the past two years. The 
deployment of the PSF in Bahrain, its first since the less than successful operations in Kuwait 
in 1991 and 2003,251 brought the military wing of the GCC back in the limelight of Gulf 
politics, after it had been written off by many authors during the last years.252 In April 2012 
PSF forces conducted a joint naval exercise under the telling title “Islands of Loyalty”, seen 
to be directed primarily against the Iranian occupation of three Gulf islands claimed by the 
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UAE, and observers predict an increase of similar operations in the future.253 This goes in 
line with an increase of activity at GCC Defense meetings. As the Kuwaiti Defense ministry 
announced in a press release on the occasion of the 10th GCC Defense meeting in November 
2011, “the meeting would focus on issues concerning the boosting of cooperation amongst 
GCC states within the strategic defense domain [...] within a delicate period on a regional 
level which requires more cooperation amongst Gulf states”. 254  The Riyadh declaration 
endorsed these steps and called for the “Development of defense and security cooperation to 
ensure quickly and effectively and in a collective and unified manner confronting (sic) any 
danger or emergency.”255 Among the ideas floating around during the last two years were for 
instance plans for a Gulf missile defense shield directed against Iran.256 
But it would be misleading to characterize the increase in Gulf cooperation merely in terms 
of security cooperation. There has also been an increase in economic and political initiatives 
to foster closer cooperation. In the immediate aftermath of the protests in Bahrain, the GCC 
in March 2011 set up a Gulf Development Program, dedicating vast sums of money to 
increase the living conditions of the Bahraini population. 257  Called the “GCC Marshall 
Plan”258 by some observers, this maybe is the most blatant evidence of the above mentioned 
theory of Cooper and Taylor that economic cooperation between the GCC states can 
primarily be seen as an attempt to calm down restive population groups by providing them 
with economic benefits. In addition to these short-term approaches, several long term 
agreements were endorsed at the Riyadh Summit, for instance regarding a common GCC 
tariff,259 and various proposals for further cooperation in financial and economic affairs were 
made.260  
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But the most important discussions within the GCC during the last year centered on the Saudi 
Arabian proposal of a “Gulf Union”.261 The Riyadh declaration and the opening speech by 
King Abdullah marked the beginning of Saudi initiatives in this direction and they were 
repeated occasionally during 2012.262 Such a closer union would probably have the European 
Union as its main model with full political and economic integration as its goal and would 
result in a slow erosion of the sovereignty of the GCC member states, which explains the 
negative attitude of several smaller member states towards these proposals.263 In fact, the 
only member state to fully endorse the Saudi plans is Bahrain, which might well be the result 
of the most immediate threat to the Bahraini regime.264 In fact the other GCC states have 
often been skeptical regarding Saudi proposals for closer cooperation since the Arab Spring 
and apparently have also prevented the inclusion of Jordan and Morocco into the 
organization.265 Which of the two tendencies will prevail and to what extent the proponents 
of a union will be able to overcome fears of resulting Saudi domination in the smaller 
member states can probably be more precisely assessed in the aftermath of the 33rd GCC 
Summit meeting, which is to take place in Bahrain in late December 2012. 
5.2.4 Summary 
 
As this chapter has shown, the Arab Spring protests and the resulting domestic pressure on 
the monarchical regimes of the GCC have resulted in several important initiatives for 
increased integration between its member states. While it should be noted that already the 
years after 2000 had seen several important steps in this direction, most importantly in the 
economic sector, the Arab Spring definitely has given these attempts a new quality and a new 
dynamic.  
Therefore a positive correlation between times of a high level of threat, in this case a 
primarily domestic threat, and times of increased cooperation between the Gulf monarchies 
with effects on the GCC, primarily in the field of security cooperation, can again be observed. 
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This can clearly be seen as an attempt of the GCC states to enhance both their security and 
their legitimacy, and as attempts to balance against the source of the threat, which, like in 
1979, was perceived by the GCC members to be stemming from Iran and Shi’a groups in the 
case of the Bahraini uprisings.266  
Regarding the opposite notion of decreasing integration once the threat declines, the answer 
is difficult again, primarily due to the short temporal distance. It is furthermore unclear 
whether the level of domestic threat has actually declined. While the Syrian struggle is still 
ongoing and many former Arab Spring countries are still characterized by power struggles 
and an unclear situation, the Arab Spring has not inspired any new and successful large-scale 
demonstrations in the Arab world for over a year, and therefore can for the most part be seen 
as a thing of the past and a declining source of threat for the GCC monarchies. Nevertheless, 
the recent demonstrations in Kuwait may well serve as a reminder for Gulf rulers that the 
threat is far from gone. 
Therefore, it is impossible to assess with certainty whether the critical stance adopted by 
several smaller Gulf states towards the Saudi proposals of a Gulf Union and the inclusion of 
Jordan and Morocco into the organization, can be seen as an effect of the declining level of 
threat. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The intention of this thesis was to find and to examine driving factors for the development of 
regional integration between the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, which constitute the members 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the most evolved regional cooperation organization in the 
Arab world. Given the nature of the involved regimes and the unstable structure of the 
Middle East, neorealism seemed to be the most valuable and most fitting theory of 
International Relations for an analysis of this question. Within the broad stream of neorealist 
thought, this thesis has focused on neorealist alliance theories and especially on the idea of 
balancing against threats as explanatory factors for the development of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. These theories mainly see international and domestic threats as the drivers of 
regional integration and without a doubt have a high degree of plausibility and explanatory 
power for the emergence of GCC. In order to get a better  understanding of the connection 
between threats and the emergence and development of this organization, two case studies 
followed the theoretical considerations, analyzing the emergence of the GCC in the early 
1980s and the development of the organization in reaction to the Arab Spring 2010/11.   
As these case studies have shown, there is indeed a marked correlation between times of an 
externally and domestically threatening setting and times of increased cooperation within the 
GCC. Furthermore various concrete examples have shown how in some cases direct threats 
to the stability and legitimacy of a Gulf regime have convinced it to adopt a more positive 
stance towards integration projects in the GCC. In both of the examined time periods a 
balancing behavior of the Gulf monarchies could be observed as they tried to gain strength, 
security and increased legitimacy through closer cooperation with each other, caused by the 
supranational nature of the threat and the general notion, that a threat to one of the 
monarchies constituted a threat to all of them. This indicates that balance-of-threat theories 
are indeed well suited to explain cooperation in the Gulf region. 
Whether the opposite claim that integration would be abandoned by the member states once 
the immediate threat has passed holds true is difficult to establish given the evidence from 
this thesis. While certain tendencies in this direction could undoubtedly be identified, given 
the nature of the case studies and the constantly threatening nature of the international system 
in the Middle East, no clear picture could emerge. 
The same thing can be said regarding the question whether internal or external factors 
contributed more prominently to the development of the GCC. Given the evidence from the 
observed case studies and the achievements of the GCC in internal security cooperation, a 
certain tendency towards the prevalence of internal factors seems to emerge, as it was also 
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observed by Ramazani.267  It should however be noted, that this tendency could well be 
connected to the selection of case studies, rather than to an actual trend, as the most 
pronounced external threat to the GCC, the occupation of Kuwait by Iraqi troops in the 
summer of 1990 and the resulting developments were not included in this thesis.268 Maybe a 
more comprehensive picture about the factors for the development of the GCC could be 
gained by a closer examination of a wider array of different time periods. 
Another problematic factor can be seen in the fact that this thesis in both cases has 
concentrated merely on the most obvious source of threat, in both cases been seen by the 
GCC states as originating from Iran and from Iranian-backed Shi’a groups in the Gulf 
states,269 and not on secondary threats. But these various other factors certainly also had an 
effect on the actions of Gulf rulers and the cooperation of the Gulf states and their inclusion 
in the analysis may well lead to a more complete picture of the mechanisms that link threats 
and cooperation or even to slightly different results. 
But despite these shortfalls, inherent in the limited framework of a thesis like this, it can 
nevertheless be stated that the important role of domestic and external threats as the driving 
forces behind the regional integration of the Arab Gulf states has been shown. Or, to express 
it in the drastic terms of R.K. Ramazani, there is ample evidence for the assumption that the 
GCC was born and developed out of the realization of Gulf leaders that “if they did not hang 
together, they would hang separately.”270 
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